Home NewsBrent Is at $85 and Rising. Iran Just Asked the Houthis to Prepare to Close the Red Sea

Brent Is at $85 and Rising. Iran Just Asked the Houthis to Prepare to Close the Red Sea

by Freddy Miller
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Oil prices rose sharply in the week ending July 17, with Brent crude climbing nearly 12% over the five-day period and tracking toward a third consecutive weekly gain, as the United States and Iran escalated their exchange of attacks across the Gulf despite a memorandum of understanding that was supposed to have paused hostilities. On Wednesday the United States launched two major waves of air strikes in a single day – mostly on targets near Iran’s southern coast – marking the first time since the interim agreement that Washington conducted attacks of that scale, and continued striking on Thursday through at least a sixth consecutive night of operations. Brent for September delivery was trading at approximately $85.28 a barrel, and West Texas Intermediate reached $79.98 – levels that reflect both the direct supply disruption from Hormuz constraints and the risk premium that the Red Sea threat adds to a market already navigating the most significant Gulf supply disruption since the early 1990s. NEWSCENTRAL notes that the potential closure of the Red Sea route, if Tehran activates the Houthi threat it has now formally made, would represent an escalation of the energy market disruption well beyond what the Hormuz situation alone has produced.

The ceasefire’s breakdown is the most commercially significant development of the week for global energy markets. The interim agreement signed last month had generated enough hope for normalized supply flows that Brent had briefly returned to near pre-war price levels before the renewed hostilities reversed that move. The current round of American strikes – hitting Iranian coastal surveillance and air defense sites, military logistics infrastructure, maritime capabilities, and the Chabahar maritime control tower for the third time in a week – and Iranian counter-attacks on U.S. military infrastructure in Kuwait, with additional incidents in Bahrain and Qatar, describe a conflict that has re-escalated well above the intensity level that the ceasefire was meant to end. Iran’s formal request to the Houthi movement to stand ready to shut the Red Sea export route adds a geographic dimension that would affect energy flows through the Suez Canal, the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, and the routes that European and Asian buyers use to move refined products and crude that does not come through the Persian Gulf.

The simultaneous constraint on both major Gulf shipping routes – Hormuz for the Persian Gulf export flow and the Red Sea for Suez-routed oil – would create a supply logistics crisis without precedent in the modern energy market. The Hormuz strait currently processes roughly one-fifth of global oil supply; the Red Sea route handles approximately 10% of global trade including significant volumes of refined products and LNG. If both were simultaneously constrained, the rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope – already being used by some operators to avoid the Red Sea following earlier Houthi attacks – would add transit time and cost that the tanker market would struggle to absorb without significant price impacts on refined products in particular. Nathan Clark, Enterprise IT and Systems Architecture Analyst at NEWSCENTRAL, observes that the technology supply chain effects of sustained dual-route disruption have received insufficient analytical attention: the semiconductor and electronics components that transit between Asian manufacturing centers and European and American assembly plants through the Suez Canal are subject to the same route risk as energy commodities, and extended disruption would compound the supply chain pressures already affecting the AI hardware buildout from separate causes.

The strategic reserves dimension of the current price environment is worth tracking. The International Energy Agency has coordination mechanisms for member countries to release strategic petroleum reserves in response to supply disruptions of precisely this character, and those mechanisms were deployed earlier in the Iran conflict cycle. The effectiveness of reserve releases in moderating price spikes depends on the duration and severity of the disruption – a brief supply shock can be bridged by reserves; a sustained conflict that reduces available supply over many months eventually exceeds the buffer capacity of even the largest strategic reserve systems. Brent approaching $85 represents a level that is commercially painful for importing economies, particularly those with significant oil-denominated debt service obligations, but does not yet approach the levels that would trigger the most aggressive reserve deployment responses from consuming nations.

NEWSCENTRAL considers the tanker insurance market an important secondary indicator that the public benchmark prices do not fully capture. War risk premiums for Gulf transits have spiked significantly since the ceasefire breakdown, increasing the effective cost of moving oil from Gulf producers to Asian and European buyers beyond what the Brent spot price alone reflects. Those insurance premium increases affect the landed cost of energy in importing countries in ways that consumer price data will begin to reflect with a four-to-six-week lag.

China’s continued reduction in oil imports – which fell 41% in June year-on-year as its electric taxi fleet and behavioral shifts toward public transit reduced petroleum demand – has been one of the structural factors limiting the price impact of the Hormuz disruption relative to what comparable supply constraints produced in previous cycles. That demand moderation from the world’s largest oil importer has been functioning as a partial offset to the supply reduction, keeping Brent below the levels that previous geopolitical supply disruptions of comparable magnitude generated. NEWS CENTRAL assesses the trajectory from here as dependent on two variables that are both uncertain and interrelated: whether Iran activates the Houthi threat against the Red Sea, and whether the United States and Iran find a pathway back to the negotiating table before the dual-route closure scenario becomes an active operational reality rather than a stated threat.